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14 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR  
DEPUTY DIRECTORS  
ASSISTANT DIRECTORS

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for  
Psychological Operations

1. Attached for discussion at the Assistant Directors' Meeting on Monday, 18 June 1951, is a draft memorandum which it is proposed to distribute to the key people in the field of psychological intelligence and operations in State, CIA and Defense. The paper was written after discussions with all interested organizations, and the analysis section has had the benefit of considerable interagency comment.

2. It is requested specifically that the five general principles listed in paragraph 2 of the draft memorandum be approved.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Assistant Director  
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DRAFT MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for  
Psychological Operations

1. The attached paper is distributed for information and for such guidance as it may provide. Recognizing that further refinements may be possible it is hoped that this will clarify and stabilize existing arrangements, focus attention on any important disagreements, and isolate component problems requiring further adjustments. Recipients are not asked to indicate their formal concurrence but their comments and suggestions will be welcome and appropriate revisions will be issued. In the event that an agency disagrees with a basic point in the paper, it is requested to discuss the matter with this office and, if agreement cannot be reached, the issue should be framed for discussion and decision at a higher level.

2. The general principles of the paper, which have been approved in CIA, are briefly as follows:

a. Intelligence support for psychological operations is not a job to be undertaken by any single agency but should be a cooperative effort of State, CIA and the Military Services. (Pp. 1-5, section B, 1-12)

b. In making this cooperative effort each IAC agency should call on the others for intelligence which does not fall within its own field of dominant interest. (p. 6, para. 2)

c. The coordination of a particular paper in the psychological field, just as in other fields, should be done by the agency primarily responsible for producing that paper. (p. 7, para. 4)

d. CIA (O/IC) will assist in making arrangements and ironing out difficulties that may arise. (Pp. 7, 8, para. 6)

e. The Director of the new Psychological Strategy Board should look directly to the producing agencies for his intelligence support, but he may call on CIA (O/IC) for assistance as required. (p. 8, para. 7)

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Analysis of the Intelligence Needs of Psychological  
Operations together with an Indication of How They  
Should Be Met

A. SCOPE

For the purposes of this paper the term "psychological operations" is defined much more narrowly than in the President's directive of 4 April 1951, setting up the Psychological Strategy Board. The field of that Board's activities is so broad that its intelligence support must draw on the total funds of intelligence available to the Government. This paper, however, confines itself to the particular intelligence needs of the policy officers, the planners and the operators in the specialized field of propaganda and information. The State Department, the Military Services and CIA are all concerned with this type of activity as well as with the provision of intelligence to support it.

For convenience sake research performed on contract by non-governmental organizations is excluded from this paper since it presents a somewhat different problem and will be dealt with elsewhere.

B. ANALYSIS

The following types of intelligence are needed at one time or another to support psychological operations. It is recognized that these categories are not always distinct and that a certain amount of overlapping is inevitable. The purpose of the breakdown is to show the extent and the principal kinds of work that are needed and where it is being done. This will enable us to address, in section C, the problem of coordination.

1. General Social, Cultural, Political and Anthropological Research

Examples: Level of education, standard of living, political views or cultural ties of various groups such as French labor, Uzbek tribesmen, etc.

This kind of intelligence is clearly the responsibility of the State Department. Finished intelligence of this sort, however, is of great use to the other agencies; for example, G-2 might, on the basis of State's analysis of the area as a whole or of certain civilian groups, produce a paper on the level of education of the French Army, or the political reliability of Uzbek soldiers.

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2. Identification and Elaboration of Psychological Vulnerabilities

a. Strategic, basic or long-range vulnerabilities:

Examples: Aspirations of social groups, e.g., of peasants for redistribution of land; oppression of religious, nationalist and other groups; deprivation of liberties; fears and conflicts between groups and countries.

This kind of intelligence job would appear to fall on the State Department insofar as the vulnerabilities are in the social, political and cultural fields and the groups under study are non-military. The identification and elaboration of a vulnerability within the Soviet Air Force, based for example on unfair discrimination between flying and ground personnel, would of course be the responsibility of Air Intelligence. The proper identification of psychological vulnerabilities is of such importance, however, and a coordinated attack on the targets selected is so vital that these targets should be agreed upon interdepartmentally and, therefore, the finished intelligence that identifies them should be more than the work of any single agency.

b. Tactical, short-range, current vulnerabilities or themes:

Examples: Failure to reach goals of 5 year plan; Chinese wheat shortage occasioned by shipments to India; obstructionism of Gromyko at Paris Deputies Meeting.

These vulnerabilities are in support of those mentioned in 2 (a), whether the particular strategic vulnerability has been specifically listed and studied or not. The role of intelligence in identifying and elaborating these "tactical" vulnerabilities is a different one largely because of the speed necessary. Although the basic division of responsibility between departments still applies, each intelligence unit should feel free to call this kind of vulnerability to the attention of its operating counterparts. Interdepartmental coordination is not required on the intelligence level but can be handled satisfactorily by the operating people working, for example, through the PCB.

3. Estimates - predictions with respect to possible future developments.

Examples: How would the Russian people react to an Atomic bombing of Moscow? How strong would be the French

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will to fight if war came in 1952? What would be the effect on the Chinese Army of a propaganda attack on the political reliability of their officers?

The first example is a national estimate and should be produced much like other NIE's. The second example is either a national estimate or, if produced in some other way, should be coordinated between the intelligence agencies. The last example is the responsibility of G-2.

4. Factual Studies on Particular Subjects or Groups

These studies are of use to the psychological operators, but not exclusively so, nor are they prepared by special psychological intelligence support units.

Examples: Land tenure in Iran, economic position of the Chinese in Malaya, slave labor in Bulgaria, etc.

The above reports would be produced by the State Department whereas a paper discussing recruitment methods in the Soviet Navy would of course be done in ONI.

5. Opinion and Attitudes of Key Groups

Examples: General - attitudes of French labor, morale in the Soviet Army, etc.

Specific - Czech attitude on the A-bomb, Dutch opinion on trade with the East, Yugoslav peasants' attitude toward Tito, etc.

In this category also much of the work falls on the State Department. Where the group studied is a military one, however, the job is for the military intelligence organizations.

6. Accessibility of Various Groups

Examples: Distribution of radios among Italian workers, literacy of Chinese soldiers (ref. "level of education" under paragraph 1), the influential press in Shanghai, etc.

The criterion here is the same as elsewhere: What group is being considered?

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## 7. Current Intelligence

General information on recent events including indications of stress in the regime:

Examples: Assassination or defection of a prominent Communist, new decrees and control measures, U.S. and foreign policy statements, etc.

This kind of general information should be part of the equipment of all psychological operators as well as other officials concerned with foreign affairs. It is supplied in part by the newspapers and in part by the current intelligence unit in each of the agencies.

## 8. Biographic Intelligence

Examples: The career, character and weaknesses of various leaders, the general characteristics of present leadership.

Papers giving the information mentioned in the first example should be produced in the biographic sections of each of the intelligence agencies. In cases where two organizations have files on the same individual, the finished paper should be coordinated. A study on the general characteristics of present leadership would also need to be coordinated.

## 9. Script Material

Unclassified or de-classified information for use by the operators in writing scripts.

Examples: (a) simple biographic information  
(b) current raw intelligence  
(c) "magazine-type" research

The vast majority of this type of material should be accumulated and used by the operators without reference to intelligence support. In cases where the operating people do not have the information, they should make specific requests on their supporting intelligence units. In such cases the requests would fall in one or another of the categories of intelligence already listed in this paper.

## 10. Propaganda Analysis and Analysis of Psychological Operations:

Examples: What is the Soviet line this month? How much emphasis is being given to Iran? What are the psychological facilities of the Soviets for use in Iran? Report on new techniques and PW equipment.

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Much of the substantive work in the radio portion of this field is done by [redacted] The rest is up to the State Department, although the Military will naturally analyze propaganda directed specifically at the Armed Forces, whether in a Theater of Operations or not. Responsibility for reports on foreign organizational arrangements for psychological warfare and on PW techniques and equipment falls on State or the appropriate military department depending on what aspect of the problem is being considered. Initiative for such reports may come from anywhere, and the actual production will in many cases be an interdepartmental undertaking.

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11. Evaluations of U.S. Psychological Operations

Analyzing both the audience reached and their reactions.

Examples: How effective is the VOA in Egypt? PW lessons learned in the Korean war. VOA reception in the Ukraine.

The major burden of evaluating a U. S. psychological operation should fall on the operating side of the agency concerned. They are in the best position to know what they are doing and are vitally concerned with its effectiveness. This does not mean that their findings should be accepted without question. The intelligence specialists in the same department should occasionally examine the results independently, and at intervals private organizations should be asked to check these evaluations, for example, by conducting a public opinion survey where this is possible.

12. Technical Communications (Jamming) Information

This subject has been taken up by NSC. CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence was given primary responsibility and is working out arrangements for the necessary coordination with other agencies.

C. COORDINATION

1. A large proportion of all the foreign intelligence collected or produced by the U.S. agencies is of value in planning or executing psychological operations. Most of this information was being produced for military or political purposes long before there was general recognition of the importance of psychological warfare and propaganda. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to attempt to coordinate the production of all this intelligence merely on the basis of one of the several purposes which it serves--psychological operations. At the same time it is clear that for propaganda and psychological purposes more intelligence is needed than would otherwise be the case. The difference, however, is chiefly quantitative and not one of kind. An inspection of the twelve types of intelligence listed

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in section B above shows that there is no clear dividing-line between the psychological and the political--even though such a line might possibly be drawn between the psychological and the military. Because of the impossibility of dividing political and psychological and because much of this intelligence is already being produced and is being coordinated on an ad hoc basis, it becomes necessary to treat the additional intelligence necessary for psychological support in the same way as that which is already being produced for political and other purposes. If present coordination is inadequate, the problem is a general one to be addressed all along the line and not by special arrangements in the "psychological" field.

2. In order to produce the best intelligence with a reasonable expenditure of money and trained personnel and with a minimum of jurisdictional friction between the agencies, there is one important concept that must be understood and accepted. This is the principle of interdependence, which involves a recognition of departmental specializations, a realization that every agency in the psychological field has intelligence needs in each of the twelve categories listed, and a willingness to cooperate in an attempt to fulfill the needs of other agencies besides one's own. (See NSCID 3.) This interdependence requires:
  - a. That each IAC agency perform its work with high competence and thus develop a confidence on the part of the other agencies. Conversely this implies that each agency in good faith provide full information to the others and make known any dissatisfaction with their products. Complaints should be taken as high as necessary to achieve results.
  - b. That each agency make extraordinary efforts to give prompt attention to the requests of others and not to give precedence automatically to internal requests over those received from other agencies. These decisions on priorities can be made only by the responsible head of the producing unit, and he can make wise decisions only if fully informed by the several requesting offices.
  - c. That the intelligence people have or get the authority necessary from their own chiefs to enable them to deal directly and informally with their opposite numbers in the other agencies.
3. In order to produce the kind of intelligence support needed, a close relationship should be established between the psychological planners and operators and their intelligence counterparts. Although the Air Force's psychological division must look primarily to AFOIN for support, this should not be construed

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to prevent direct contacts by the psychological division under AFOIN sponsorship, with State intelligence. It is important that all PW planners and operators understand the fields of the various intelligence units and to some extent are familiar with their current production plans. Only in this way can satisfactory support be provided.

4. Initiative in the field of psychological intelligence can and should come from several different places: any one of the IAC intelligence agencies, any of the operators or planners, Mr. Barrett's PCB and its secretariat, and the new PSB with its director and staff. The first thing to do with an idea or request in this field is to get it to an intelligence agency. The departmental operators and planners would naturally go to the intelligence agencies in their own departments. Ideas from PCB can reach Intelligence through any one of a number of channels, the most usual of which would be from Mr. Barrett and P to Mr. Armstrong and R. (The channels for PSB will be discussed below.) It then becomes the responsibility of whatever intelligence agency has been approached to get the information requested. The principal burden may fall on it or may be passed to another agency with more direct interest in the subject matter. In either case the person ultimately to do the job proceeds to get it done and coordinates with others as needed, calling and chairing ad hoc meetings if necessary. Thus, neither does State do all the coordinating nor is it relieved of doing any.

5. CIA has several distinct responsibilities in the field of psychological intelligence. O/PC's interest as a consumer need not be discussed. O/O contributes both raw and evaluated intelligence largely from its [redacted]

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[redacted] The other collection offices operate as for other types of intelligence and the same is true of the handling and dissemination of the raw and finished product. O/SI is responsible for the scientific and technical intelligence on communications and jamming. O/NE will coordinate the production of national estimates in the psychological field as they do in any other. The Office of Intelligence Coordination has a responsibility to see that appropriate intelligence support is provided for psychological operations and that the intelligence activities of the government in this field are properly coordinated.

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6. CIA's coordinating responsibility, which falls on O/IC, does not involve a substantive review of the papers produced elsewhere; nor is it a channel for transmitting the requests or output of one agency to another. It does provide a neutral place to which problems and complaints can be brought if the usual direct approach has been found inadequate. This means that O/IC is concerned with difficulties and arrangements and should not be looked to for help in coordinating a substantive

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paper where the experts involved can accomplish it themselves. O/IC will take such initiative as it can to improve the coordination of intelligence support for psychological operations, but it will be forced to rely to a considerable degree on the other agencies to point out defects or, if possible, to effect improvements without reference to O/IC.

7. To whom does the director of the new Psychological Strategy Board look for his intelligence support? In pursuance of the analysis and principles developed in this paper, he should look directly to the producing agency. Although this paper has been focused on the information and propaganda aspects of psychological operations, the principles are equally applicable to the other fields of the Board's activity. If it is clear which intelligence agency is responsible for the desired information, this direct approach is simpler and more effective. If the PSB staff does not know where to get the information they seek, they should raise the matter with CIA (Office of Intelligence Coordination), which will either direct them to the proper agency or arrange for the responsibility to be clearly placed. If the quality of the reports received is inferior, the PSB staff, like any other requestor, should discuss the matter with the producing agency. If unable to achieve results this way, however, they should bring their problem to the attention of CIA (Office of Intelligence Coordination) and request assistance.

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